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Tax Metamorphosis
A MINUSCULE CONTRIBUTION TO LAW ) LITERATURE
Stephen B. Cohen
Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., an eminent judge who served on the United States
Tax Court for a quarter-century, died this past January. This essay discusses
his i968 opinion in Edwards v. Commissioner.
- The Editors
jY FAVORITE COURSE ever, fourth-year
high school Latin, was also the most
demanding. We translated all twelve
books of Virgils epic poem, The _Eneid, line by
dactylic hexameter line, and large chunks of
Ovids Metamorphoses besides. The course was
valuable in many ways, not least of which was
that only my youthful reading of Ovid's Meta-
morphoses later enabled me to make sense of
the U.S. Tax Court's otherwise inscrutable
decision in Edwards v. Commissioner.'
Edwards involved a dramatic and puzzling
departure from established rules for classifying
corporate securities. The issue was whether
promissory notes issued by a closely held
corporation, Birmingham Steel (BS), were
truly debt or equity. The facts were as follows.
BS' business was the fabrication of steel
products. In the late i95os, BS had significant
losses. By i96o, its liabilities exceeded its assets,
and BS consequently had a negative net worth.
BS desperately needed additional capital in
order to continue operating. The company's
principal shareholder, a Mr. Birmingham, who
owned nearly 8o percent of BSs stock, made
cash contributions of $240ooo to BS in 1961
and 1962. In return, BS issued to Birmingham
the notes that became the subject of the
Edwards case.
Despite the large cash contributions from
Birmingham, BSs losses continued, and the
excess of liabilities over assets increased fur-
ther. With the prospects for turnaround grim,
Birmingham and the BS minority sharehold-
ers decided in 1962 to try to sell BS. At the
same time, a Mr. Edwards and a Mr. Disler
were planning to expand their business of
manufacturing and selling heat exchangers.
They needed the kind of steel fabrication
equipment that BS owned. After inspecting
BS's plant, Edwards and Disler purchased all
the stock of BS plus the notes issued by BS
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and held by Birmingham.
It was a perfect match. In the following
years, BS resumed profitable operations. BSs
new owners, Edwards and Disler, then caused
BS to pay off $60,000 of the notes that they
had acquired from Birmingham.
The tax treatment of this $60,000
depended on whether the notes were regarded
as debt or equity. If the notes were debt, as
Edwards and Disler claimed, then the
$60,000 would produce preferentially treated
capital gain. If the notes were equity, as the
IRS claimed, then the $60,000 would be
taxed at full ordinary income rates. (The
reasons for the different tax treatments of debt
and equity do not affect our story and can be
left to the tax mavens.)
In short, the question before the Tax Court
in Edwards was whether the notes - issued by
BS to Birmingham, sold to Edwards and
Disler, and then paid off- should be regarded
as debt or equity. Judge Theodore Tannen-
wald, Jr., who wrote the opinion for the Tax
Court, made two very curious findings: first,
that "the promissory notes in issue constituted
valid outstanding indebtedness of Birming-
ham Steel in the hands of ... Birmingham";
and second, that the notes changed character
and became equity when purchased from
Birmingham by Edwards and Disler.'
How did Judge Tannenwald justify the first
finding, that the notes were truly debt in Bir-
minghams hands? He didn't. Instead, Judge
Tannenwald simply wrote,
We think that, on the basis of the record
before us ... the notes in question constituted
bona fide indebtedness in the hands of ...
Birmingham. We see no reason to detail the
various elements which led us to this factual
conclusion.
3
Could I do better? The legal principles
determining whether to classify such obliga-
tions as debt or equity are famously imprecise.
Professor Boris Bittker has called the judicial
precedents
a viper's tangle of cases, which commonly
employ such vague criteria as intent of the
parties, the psychology of an outside lender,
substance over form, business purpose, and
tax avoidance. These judicial ruminations can
be likened - without either disrespect or loss
of clarity - to the Wall Street adage that you
can make money by being a bull, you can make
money by being a bear, but you can't make
money being a pig.
4
Congress and the Executive have also found
it difficult to prescribe definite standards. In
1969, Congress declined to clarify the distinc-
tion between debt and equity through legisla-
tion but directed the Treasury to do so
through regulations, a mandate that the
Treasury has not yet fulfilled despite the
passage of three decades.5
Notwithstanding the vague legal principles,
the circumstances of Edwards were so extreme
that the notes were obviously equity to Bir-
mingham rather than, as Judge Tannenwald
decided, debt. Two factors in particular stand
out. First, the notes were issued to a share-
holder who already owned nearly 8o percent
of the BS stock. Second, at the time of
Birmingham's cash contributions, BS had a
negative net worth and was on the verge of
collapse.
In these circumstances, the Tax Court
finding that the notes were valid debt to Bir-
mingham seems untenable. Cash contribu-
tions by a nearly-8o percent shareholder to his
negative-net-worth corporation bear so much
of the enterprise's risk that they must surely be
z Id. at 226.
3 Id. at 2Z7.
4 z Boris I. Bittker - Lawrence Lokken, FEDERAL TAxATioN OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIPTS E 91.10.3
(2d ed. i989).
5 Id. at ( 91.10.4.
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regarded as equity rather than debt. No out-
side lender would have been likely to provide
such a loan to a failing business with a negative
net worth. Birmingham, the dominant BS
shareholder, could not reasonably have ex-
pected the notes to create a genuine arm's-
length debtor-creditor relationship between
himself and BS. Indeed, if we accepted Judge
Tannenbaums judgment that notes should be
treated as genuine debt even in these extreme
circumstances, it would be difficult to imagine
any case in which notes would ever be recast as
equity.
The Tax Court's second finding, that the
notes changed from debt to equity when sold,
was equally astounding. When Edwards was
decided, it was the practice of the courts and
the IRS to determine the debt or equity char-
acter of such notes with reference to only one
point in time, the time when the notes were
originally issued. Once determined with refer-
ence to the time of the notes' issuance, this
debt or equity character remained fixed and
did not change during the life of the notes.
Of course, the debt or equity character of
the notes need not have been decided for tax
purposes once and for all when the notes were
issued. The tax authorities might have decided
to reassess this character at regular intervals,
although the administrative burden might
have proved daunting, given the hazy stan-
dards for classifying the notes as debt or
equity. In any event, such an alternative
approach was never embraced before Judge
Tannenbaum's opinion in Edwards. Judge
Featherston, in dissent, was prompted to
muse, "One may wonder what it is that gave
these pieces of paper the chameleon-like
ability to change character as they traveled
from hand to hand."
6
How didJudge Tannenwald justify holding
that the character of the notes changed from
debt in the hands of Birmingham to equity in
the hands of Edwards and Disler? The judge
first stated that the notes were equity for
Edwards and Disler because when they pur-
chased the notes, "[BS] was in a substantial
deficit position";7 thus, "[t]he face amount of
the so-called notes ... was in the fullest sense
at risk."8 But this argument proves too much:
When the notes were originally issued to Bir-
mingham, BS also had a substantial deficit,
and the face amount of the notes was similarly
at risk in the fullest sense. Therefore, applied
consistently, the argument should have
required the court's dassifying the notes as
equity to Birmingham to begin with, contrary
to its actual finding.
Judge Tannenwald also argued that the
notes changed character because "[Edwards'
and Dislers] prime objective at all times was
to acquire the physical assets of [BS].... Only
at the last minute did they learn of the out-
standing corporate notes."9 However, the fact
remains that Edwards and Disler purchased
the notes and stock of BS rather than simply
BS's assets. Whether they would have
preferred to acquire the assets alone or learned
of the notes' existence sooner or later is
irrelevant.
To summarize, both Tax Court findings in
Edwards - first, that the notes were true debt
to Birmingham; second, that the notes
changed character on transfer to Edwards and
Disler - seem absurd.' How could cash
advanced by a majority shareholder to a
Edwards, 5o T.C. at 231.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 229.
Edwards and Disler appealed, and the ioth Circuit reversed. Edwards v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 578
(ioth Cir. 1969). Inexplicabl} the IRS decided not to challenge the Tax Court's first finding, that the
notes were genuine debt when issued to Birmingham. Therefore the Court of Appeals treated the
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negative-net-worth corporation be anything
but an equity contribution? How could the
character of the notes change on their
transfer?"*
Moreover, the Tax Court's ultimate result
in Edwards - the judgment that the notes were
equity in the hands of Edwards and Disler -
did not require or depend on the Tax Court's
untenable findings. The Tax Court could have
achieved the identical result with the follow-
ing, more plausible findings: first, that the
notes were equity when issued to Birming-
ham, the dominant BS shareholder, by a cor-
poration with a negative net worth; second,
that the character of the notes did not change
on transfer to Edwards and Disler. In other
words, the Tax Court could easily have found
that the notes were originally equity to Bir-
mingham and remained equity on transfer to
Edwards and Disler.
Surely, Judge Tannenwald, a brilliant and
distinguished jurist, realized all this. Why,
then, did he make the questionable findings in
Edwards? Why didn't he adopt the more
reasonable findings described above, which
would have produced the same result?
These questions returned me ineluctably to
Ovid's Metamorphoses, so named because many
of the more than 2oo classical legends re-
counted in the work involve a metamorphosis,
or transformation. In the best known of the
stories, "Pyramus and Thisbe," two thwarted
lovers commit suicide; Pyramus is then trans-
formed into the fruit of the mulberry tree. (I
forget what happened to Thisbe.) William
Shakespeare used the story for the play-
within-a-play in A Midsummer Night's Dream.
There is one more critical fact. The first
name of Birmingham, the dominant BS share-
holder to whom the notes were originally
issued, was Ovid. Thus had Judge Tannen-
wald made more reasonable findings in
Edwards, he would have missed a golden
opportunity: the chance to rule that the BS
notes underwent one of Ovid metamorpho-
ses. Such a chance, Judge Tannenwald may
have thought, was simply too good to
resist./2
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original debt character of the notes as given. It disagreed, however, with the Tax Court's second find-
ing, that the notes could change character on transfer from Birmingham to Edwards and Disler.
n I am deeply indebted to Prof. Marvin Chirelstein, who posed these questions about Edwards in his
corporate shareholder taxation course at Yale Law School in the fall of 1970.
